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Simulatable Auditing in Micro-Databases
Li Deng
How to protect individuals’ privacy while releasing microdata tables for analysis pur-
poses has attracted significant attention. We study the case where different microdata tables
generalized over the same underlying secret table may be released upon users’ queries. To
satisfy privacy constraints, an auditing system must determine whether the next query can
be safely answered based on the history of answered queries. However, when answering a
new query is not safe, denying it may not be, either, since a denial itself may still convey
some sensitive information to the user. We first model this issue in the context of releasing
microdata tables. Inspired by the Simulatable Auditing technique in statistical databases,
we propose a safe strategy for auditing queries that ask for microdata tables generalized
over secret tables. The strategy can provide provably safe answers and good data utility.
We also study how to efficiently maintain the history of answered queries for the auditing
purpose. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study on the simulatable auditing
issue of microdata queries.
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The issue of privacy-preservation in data publication has drawn significant attention lately.
There are two fundamentally conflicting goals in such a data publication application: Data
utility and privacy. On one hand, many organizations need to give datasets to third parties
for analysis or research purposes. On the other hand, such organizations need to protect
individuals’ private information contained in such datasets. For example, a healthcare orga-
nization may share with researchers their databases of medical records but the organization
is obliged to keep the privacy of its patients. An ideal solution in such scenarios should
maximize the data utility while protecting individuals’ privacy. In this thesis, we address
this issue by providing models and strategies that allow analysts to query a dataset while
protecting individuals’ private information contained in the dataset.
Privacy issues exist in many forms of data publications. First, private data may be pub-
lished as the so-called micro-data tables in which explicit identifiers have been removed
and other identifying values have been generalized with coarser-grained values. Nonethe-
less, individuals may be re-identified from such a micro-data table by linking it to other
data sources. For example, as shown in [45], anonymized micro-data tables of medical
records from a hospital may be combined with identifying information from a voters’ list
to infer medical conditions of individuals, which clearly violates their privacy. Second,
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numerical private data may also be published as their aggregates. In such a case, private
values may be inferred by combining multiple aggregates over such values. In this thesis,
we shall focus on data publication in terms of micro-data tables.
From another aspect, data publication applications may be classified into two cate-
gories, namely, online and offline applications. In an offline application, data owners will
compute one or more micro-data tables over the secret dataset before releasing the tables.
Performance is generally not critical here since the computation may take as much time as
needed. Also, what micro-data to release is mainly decided by the data owner and users
of such micro-data usually only play a passive role. On the other hand, in an online ap-
plication, users interact with a database to ask for specific forms of data. In such a case,
performance is typically more important since users’ queries cannot be adversely delayed.
Also, since it is the user who decides which query to be asked next, data owners must ex-
amine each new query together with all previously answered queries to determine whether
privacy requirement can be satisfied. In this thesis, we shall address the online application
in which users may ask for micro-data tables. We call such a system micro-database.
Micro-data tables are obtained using generalization techniques that transform a secret
relational table into a micro-data table containing coarser values for satisfying privacy prop-
erties, such as k-anonymity [43] and l-diversity [34]. For example, a secret table containing
patients’ personal information, such as names, genders, social identity numbers, addresses,
DOBs, and disease information, may be generalized into a micro-data table that has names
and social identity numbers removed, and other attributes, except disease information, gen-
eralized. Although significant efforts have been seen on privacy preservation for releasing
micro-data tables, most of these work are for the offline application of pre-computing one
or more micro-data tables to be released, which is different from the online application that
we shall study.
Closest to our work, the issue of micro-data auditing is studied in [9] where multiple
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views on a secret table are checked for violations of privacy requirements. However, the
case where a query cannot be answered and the denial may disclose sensitive information
is not the focus in [9]. This issue is addressed in the context of statistical databases in [25],
that is, whether giving answers or denials to queries asking for statistical aggregates (SUM,
MAX) will violate privacy requirements. We address a similar problem in the different
context of micro-databases, and we shall propose an improved strategy than the one in [25].
This thesis addresses three issues: (1) Modeling what information is disclosed by pre-
viously disclosed answers to queries; (2) Determining whether a new query is safe with
respect to privacy requirements and the answer can be given; (3) Designing an online au-
diting strategy to satisfy the privacy requirements while not adversely impacting the data
utility. Based on the privacy property !-uncertainty introduced in [9], we shall define the
auditing problem in the context of a micro-database. We propose a novel auditing strategy
for micro-databases for determining whether answering a query satisfies !-uncertainty. We
study the maintenance of a so-called knowledge dictionary that keeps track of all previ-
ously answered queries and their answers. We also study how concurrent queries can be
more efficiently handled and provide optimized strategies for this purpose.
The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. The rest of this chapter reviews
relevant background knowledge in inference control, simulatable auditing, and micro-data
disclosure. In Chapter 2, we discuss related work on auditing and micro-data disclosure.
In Chapter 3, we give motivating examples and an overview of the auditing system, its
assumptions, and basic notations. The proposed strategy for the auditing system and corre-
sponding algorithms are presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, we discuss how to efficiently
update knowledge dictionary for the system. As extensions of the work, we present the han-
dling of concurrent queries and improved strategies for improving data utility in Chapter 6.
In Chapter 7, we give conclusions and future work.
3
1.1 Inference control
Our study of the auditing problem is partly inspired by a similar problem studied in the con-
text of inference control in statistical databases. In this section, we briefly review inference
control.
Inference control has been extensively studied for more than forty years. The goal
is to prevent adversaries from inferring secret numeric values from their statistical aggre-
gates. There are broadly two types of inference control techniques, restriction-based and
perturbation-based, for protecting privacy in statistical databases. In the restriction-based
techniques, the user queries the database through a privacy protection mechanism, which
may decide to either deny the query or answer it, in order to ensure privacy. Perturbation-
based techniques add random noises to sensitive data or answers to queries such as to
prevent the violation of privacy requirements.
To determine the safety of answering queries, restriction-based techniques base their
decisions on various properties, including the minimal number of values aggregated by a
query, the maximum number of common values aggregated by different queries, the ap-
proximate intervals that can be guessed from query results, and the maximal rank of a
matrix representing all answered queries. Instead of enumerating all the methods in the
literature, we show a few examples of restriction-based techniques in the following.
First, one of the first efforts on inference control is the query set size control. The subset
of a relational table that matches a query’s WHERE clauses is called a query set. Query set
size control denies a query whose query set includes less than k tuples. If the database has
totally n tuples, then the query whose query set is greater than n− k is prohibited, since its
complement includes less than k tuples, which violates the control. For example, consider
the simple relation comm shown in Table 1, and suppose the query set size control is in
place with k = 2. The following query has a singleton query set (whose only member is




WHERE employee=’Alice’ and quarter=’Q1’ and location=’Domestic’
employee quarter location commission
Alice Q1 Domestic 800
Alice Q1 Interational 200
Bob Q1 Domestic 500
Mary Q1 Domestic 1200
Mary Q1 International 800
Bob Q2 Interational 1500
Mary Q2 Domestic 500
Jim Q2 Domestic 1000
Table 1: An Example Relation comm for Inference Control
By considering that the WHERE clause is the conjunction of three conditions, we can
ask the following two queries. The query set of both queries is between k (two) and n− k
(seven). Both queries will thus be allowed. Subtracting the result of the second query from
that of the first query leads to the inference of the first record. We can similarly infer any
query asking for the aggregation of less than k records.
SELECT SUM(commission)
FROM comm
WHERE quarter=’Q1’ and location=’Domestic’
SELECT SUM(commission)
FROM comm
WHERE employee<>’Alice’ and quarter=’Q1’ and location=’Domestic’
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The above tracker will depend on records to be inferred, and each inference requires
a different tracker. A better way is to find a universal tracker and pad it to any record (or
query) to be inferred. For example, in Table 1 we can form the tracker with the selection
condition employee=’Mary’ or employee=’Jim’. Because the tracker’s query
set has four records, the following two queries will both be allowed.
SELECT SUM(commission)
FROM comm




Adding the results to the two queries together gives us the total commission in the
table. Next, without loss of generality, suppose we want to infer the first record. We ask
the following two queries.
SELECT SUM(commission)
FROM comm
WHERE (employee=’Alice’ AND quarter=’Q1’ AND location=’Domestic’)




WHERE (employee=’Alice’ AND quarter=’Q1’ AND location=’Domestic’)
OR (employee<>’Mary’ AND employee<>’Jim’)
We can see that the first query pads the first record with the tracker, and the second
query pads it with the complement of the tracker. Adding the result to the two queries and
then subtracting the value from the total commission that we have computed earlier leads to
the inference of the first record. Similarly we can infer any query asking for the aggregation
of less than k records. Because the inference pads the query to be inferred with both the
tracker and the complement of the tracker. In order for such two queries to be allowed, the
size of the tracker must meet a more stringent condition, that is it must be between 2k and
n− 2k. However, more complicated trackers may relax this condition. Trackers are indeed
examples of the more general linear system attack we shall discuss shortly. However, the
study of trackers nonetheless demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the query set size control.
The above tracker attacks can be generalized with the linear system attack based on the
following model. Given sensitive values x1, x2, . . . , xn, any SUM query on those values
can be modeled as an equation∑n1 aixi, where ai = 1 if xi is in the query set and ai = 0,
otherwise. A collection of m queries thus form a linear system AX = D, where A is
an m × n binary matrix, X = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), and D is the vector of query results. An
inference using the tracker can then be modeled as a sequence of elementary row operations
on the matrix A (that is, multiplying a row with a non-zero number, swapping two rows,
adding a row to another multiplied by a number).
In order to determine whether any given queries may lead to an inference, we must an-
swer the question: Does there exist a sequence of elementary row operations that transform
A into a unit row vector (that is, a vector with one 1-element and all others being 0’s)? Chin
and Ozsoyoglu show that this can be determined by first transforming A into its reduced
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row echelon form (RREF) through a special sequence of elementary row operations, that is
the Gauss-Jordan elimination.
The key result lies in that any matrix A can be transformed into a unit row vector
through a sequence of elementary row operations, if and only if its RREF includes such a
vector. The if part is trivial, because the Gauss-Jordan elimination itself is a sequence of
elementary row operations. The only if part can be proved by contradiction. A unit row
vector whose 1-element is in the first, second, or fourth position clearly cannot be a linear
combination of those four rows in the matrix. A unit row vector whose 1-element is in other
positions cannot, either. Because any linear combination of the four rows will have at least
one non-zero element in the first, second, or fourth position. The above result is essentially
a precise model for inferences of unbounded real values using SUM-only queries.
The above result also yields a method for checking whether a new query, taken together
with queries answered before, will cause inferences. A straightforward but inefficient ap-
proach is to keep all answered queries and re-computing the RREF when each new query
is received. For m queries on n values, the Gauss-Jordan elimination takes time O(m2n).
Considering that the elementary row operations on a matrix is associative, a better approach
is to incrementally updates the RREF for each newly answered query. Audit Expert main-
tains the RREF of a matrix that corresponds to the set of queries answered so far. A query
is denied when adding it to this set causes an inferences. Because the RREF of a matrix
only includes linearly independent rows, the total number of rows must be no greater than
the rank of matrix. For queries over n values, this rank cannot be greater than n. After




Recall that in an online query auditing application, the data owner will receive a sequence
of queries from a user for which answers must be providied The answer is either the true
answer of the query, or a denial. The key issue in such an application is that upon receiving
a new query that cannot be safely answered, even denying the answer may cause privacy
properties to be breached. The issue is first addressed in [25] and a corresponding Simulat-
able Auditing strategy is proposed as a solution. Our work extends the idea of simulatable
auditing from statistical databases to micro-data publication applications.
To make the above issue more concrete, we consider some examples of statistical
database auditing. Suppose that an adversary sends the first query asking for sum(x1, x2, x3)
and gets the answer 15. The adversary then asks for the second query max(x1, x2, x3),
which is denied. The denial tells the attacker that if the answer to the second query were
given, then some data value would have been compromised (that is, known by the ad-
versary). The adversary can then guess as follows. If max(x1, x2, x3) > 5 were true,
then the query would not have been denied, since no value can be compromised. Also,
max(x1, x2, x3) < 5 is not possible either, since sum(x1, x2, x3) equals 15. Consequently,
max(x1, x2, x3) = 5must have been the true answer to the second query, and the adversary
then immediately learns that x1 = x2 = x3 = 5.
This problem is possible even with the same type of queries. For example, suppose a
query asks for max(t1, t2, t3, t4) and is answered as 10. Then for the second query asking
formax(t1, t2, t3), it is not safe to deny since the denial will tell the adversary that t4 must
have the value 10, because this is the only case a value can be compromised and thus the
query would be denied. Similarly, if the second query is answered, the adversary can ask
for a third query for any two of these three values, and we would be in the same situation
where a denial is not safe.
The above examples show that the auditing system may fail to protect data privacy
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even when denying a query. The denial itself leaks information from which the adversary
learns secret values. The reason is that the auditing system decides to deny a query based on
information not available to the adversary (that is, the secret values). That is, if the decision
for allowing or denying a query depends on the actual data values, then the decision will
convey information to avdersaries, even if it is simply a denial.
A simulatable auditing strategy is proposed in [25]. The model is based on the idea that
the auditing process is simulatable in the sense that all decisions to either deny or answer a
query is independent of the actual data values. In this way, the denial of a query does not
convey any information to the adversary beyond what is already known by him/her from
previously answered queries’ answers. In another word, the adversary can tell by him-
self/herself what decision would be made. Simulatable auditing keeps all posted queries
q1, ..., qt and the answers a1, ..., at to decide whether to answer or deny a newly posed
query qt+1. Note that queries q1, ..., qt are only the answered queries. The denied queries
will not be counted as knowledge of adversaries since the denied queries are asked by the
adversaries and the denials do not carry any additonal information.
More formally, simulatable auditing is defined in [25] as: An auditor is simulatable
if the decision to deny or give an answer to the query qt is made based exclusively on
q1, ..., qt, and a1, ..., at−1 (and not at and not the dataset X=x1, ..., xn) and possible also
the underlying probability distribution D from which the data was drawn.
1.3 Micro-Data Disclosure
Unlike in statistical databases, the key issue of micro-data disclosure is for the data owner
to release generalized views, called microdata tables, over the secret table while protecting
individual’s privacy. Various privacy properties have been proposed, such as k-anonymity,
l-diversity, t-closeness, uncertainty, indistinguishability, and so on. Various generalization
techniques have also been proposed to transform a relational table into micro-data tables
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that satisfy given privacy properties. We shall review these through a few examples in the
following.
An example of micro-data table T is shown in Table 2. Suppose the sensitive attribute
is patients’ medical conditions. Simply deleting the identifier Name before releasing the
table is not sufficient due to potential linking attacks using the quasi-identifiers, the attribute
DoB in this case. The sensitive attribute for a tuple may potentially be linked to a unique
person though such quasi-identifiers.






























Table 2: A Micro-Data Table and Three Generalizations
To prevent the linking attack, the micro-data table needs to be generalized to protect
each individual’s anonymity in the table. The k-anonymity property is proposed for this
purpose. k-anonymity is to obfuscate quasi-identifier values such that an adversary can
only link a real world individual to at lease k tuples in the micro-data table. The tabular
g1(T ) in Table 1 shows a generalization that satisfies 2-anonymity. Any identity in this
release will belong to a group of two tuples that are anonymous. Therefore, a linking attack
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cannot bind a person to a unique tuple through the quasi-identifier. However, k-anonymity
by itself is not sufficient since linking a person to the second group in g1(T ) already reveals
the condition to be cancer; or if the adversary knows that Eve does not has toothache, by
linking Eve to third group, Eve’s condition has been compromised.
To avoid having only the same sensitive values in a group and the above external
knowledge-based attacks, the generalization must also ensure enough diversity inside each
group of sensitive values, namely, to satisfy the l-diversity property. For example, assume
2-diversity is desired. If the generalization g2(T ) is disclosed, a person can at best be linked
to a group with three different conditions among which each is equally likely to be that per-
son’s real condition. The desired privacy property is thus satisfied. Various algotithms have
been proposed to apply l-diversity in micro-data generalization.
On the other hand, when the generation algorithms is publicly known, the above privacy
metric needs to be applied more carefully. If we do not consider such knowledge, an
adversary looking at g2(T ) in Table 2 can guess that the three persons in each group may
have the three conditions in any given order. Therefore, the adversary’s mental image of T
is a set of totally 3! × 3! = 36 table instances, each of which is equally likely to be T (a
common assumption is that the quasi-identifier attribute is public knowledge).
Now suppose we consider an adversary knows the generalization algorithm, which has
considered g1(T ) before it discloses g2(T ). This knowledge will enable the adversary in
excluding some invalid guesses from the permutation set. The only reason that the system
release g2(T ) instead of g1(T ) is that g1(T ) violates the data privacy requirement. So the
adversary can refine his/her guesses of T to a smaller set of tables. As the result, it can be
shown that 2-diversity will be violated in this particular case (we shall omit details here).
Solutions to the above problem exists, such as that in [56]. In order to determine
whether a generalization is safe to disclose, a disclosure set is used to model adversaries’
mental image of the secret table in order to evaluate the desired privacy property, such as
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l-diversity. The evaluation is based on all considered, but unused generalizations, and is a
recursive process. For example, consider how to compute the disclosure set of next gen-
eralization, g3(T ), in Table 2. In the permutation set of g3(T ), we need to exclude any
table T , if either g1(T ) or g2(T ) satisfies 2-diversity. However, to determine whether g2(T )
satisfies 2-diversity, we would have to compute the disclosure set of g2(T ) to determine if
it violates 2-diversity of g1(T ).
The above discussions based on privacy properties such as k-anonymity and l-diversity
only apply to the disclosure of anonymized micro-data table in offline applications. For
online applications where users may ask for specific views over the micro-data table, only
limited efforts have been made, as demonstrated in Table 3 where data is published as
multiple views over the same secret table.
Private Micro-Table
Name Job Salary Condition
George Manager 70K cold
John Manager 90K Obesity















Table 3: Privacy compromised from views
Uncertainty and indistinguishability are two privacy properties proposed for the online
application of data publication. Uncertainty means that given a set of k distinct private
values, the adversary cannot tell which private value an individual actually has. The ex-
ample of applying uncertainty problem to multiple micro-data views is shown in table 3,
where none of the three released answers to queries will violate the privacy requirement.
However, by combining all three views, John’s medical condition will be known.
Indistinguishability refers to the property that the adversary cannot see the difference
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among k distinct individuals based on the released micro-data, such that none of the k indi-
viduals would draw special attentions from the adversaries. Indistinguishability is another
aspect of privacy that is different from uncertainty. For example, an adversary may reveal
an employee John’s salary to be in a large interval (say, 100K to 300K annually). There
may be enough uncertainty. However, if the adversary also reveal that the salaries of all
other employees are in ranges that are very dierent from John’s range (say, in ranges of 50K
to 100K), then John’s privacy may still be considered as violated, since he will draw special
attentions from adversaries. As another example, suppose from the released data we can
infer that all patients in a hospital may only have Cold or SARS except that John may have
Cold or AIDS. Even though the uncertainty of John’s condition has the same amount of
uncertainty as that of the other patients, John may still feel his privacy is violated, since
he is the only one who possibly has AIDS. For the protection from being brought to the




There are generally two categories of applications for protecting data privacy, online appli-
cations and offline applications. In the former, users query the database and the database
may deny the query or alter the answer to a query in order to ensure privacy. This is also
known as query auditing [13, 22, 25, 41]. In the offline application, the original database is
first sanitized or generalized so as to preserve privacy before releasing. The generalization
technique has received significant attention lately [1, 4, 20, 28, 29]. The results obtained in
the online applications may yield better data utility in the sense that only queries of interest
to a user are answered, whereas in the offline applications, the user has more accesses to
data since the entire sanitized database is available to him/her.
The main challenge for online auditing is to answer queries without allowing inferences
of secret individual values. The earliest auditing work include [13] and [41] for statistical
databases, which show that with queries involving at least k data elements, each pair over-
lapping in at most r data elements, any data set can be compromised in (2k − (l + 1))/r
queries by an adversary knowing l data elements. For fixed k, l and r, if the auditor denies
the (2k − (l + 1))/r and further queries, the individual data elements are protected. The
auditor logs all queries and denies the query qi satisfying that |qi| < k, |qi
⋂
qt| > r(t < i),
or i < (2k − (l + 1))/r.
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The auditing methods in [15] checks whether each new query can be safely answered
based on a history of previously answered queries. These auditors are simulatable since
the denies do not leak any informaiton about the actual data. The authors of [15, 22, 25]
considered the same problem in more specific settings of both offline and online auditing.
The auditing methods in [25, 33] consider if the decision itself leaks any privacy while
solving the problem that a denial answer leaks information to adversaries . In [25], the
authors build a simulatable auditor in statistical database for SUM and MAX queries. The
auditor checks whether each new query can be safely answered based on the set of previous
query answers, which is known as the knowledge base. In this method, the denied query
does not leak any information since the decision to answer a new query or not does not
depend on actual databases. To improve data utility for simulatable auditing, the authors
in [33] propose a method that bind denied queries together to increase data utility while
keeping data privacy in an acceptable range.
In the offline auditing problem, the auditor is given a set of queries q1, ..., qn and true
answers a1, ...at and it must determine if a breach of privacy is possible with those queries
answered. If only sum or only max queries are considered, then polynomial-time audit-
ing algorithms are known to exist [7]. However, when sum and max queries are inter-
mingled, then determining whether a value can be uniquely determinded is known to be
NP-hard [15]. In [24], the auditors consider auditing subcube queries which take the form
of a sequence of 0s, 1s and *s where the *s represent “don’t care”. For example, the query
10**1* matches all entries with a 1 in the first position, 0 in the second, 1 in the fifth and
anything else in the remaining positions. Assuming sum queries over the subcubes, they
demonstrate that when a compromise can occur will depend on the number of *s in the
queries and also on the range of input data values. In [22], the authors investigate the of-
fline sum auditing problem of boolean data. They begin by proving that the offline sum
auditing problem is coNP-hard. Then they give an efficient offline sum auditing algorithm
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in the case that the queries are one-dimensional, based on some ordering of the elements,
say x1, ..., xn, each query involves a consecutive sequence of values such as xi, xi+1, ..., xj .
The offline application of releasing tabular data have received significant attention [1,
4, 20, 28, 29]. A number of information disclosure limitation techniques have been de-
signed for the publication of census tabular data. Two main approaches have been proposed
for protecting sensitive cells in such data: Data Swapping [19, 38, 48] and Cell Suppres-
sion [30]. However, these techniques may compromise data integrity of the table. The
data swapping approach involves moving data entries from one cell to another in the con-
tingency table in a manner that is consistent with the set of published marginals. In the
data suppression approach, cells with low counts will simply be deleted, which then might
lead to the deletion of more cells. A measurement of information disclosed through query
results over secret view of a table based on the perfect secrecy notion by Shannon is given
in [18]. The authors in [11] tackle the problem ascribed to the independence assumption
made in [18].
The important notion of k-anonymity has been proposed by Samarati and Sweeney
[43, 44, 47] as a model of privacy, where the basic idea is to make a set of records indistin-
guishable from each other with respect to identifying attributes, namely, quasi-identifers.
This concept has received tremendous interest in recent years. In the k-anonymity model,
we suppress or generalize some entries in a table so as to ensure that for each tuple in the
modified table, there are at least k-1 other tuples in the same table that are identical to the
tuple in terms of quasi-identifiers. Consequently, even with the knowledge of an individ-
ual’s quasi-identifying attributes, an adversary cannot locate an individual’s record to more
than a set of at least k records. In other words, releasing a table under k-anonymization
keeps each individual hidden in a crowd of k-1 other people.
To achieve optimal k-anonymity with the most data utility is known to be computation-
ally intractable [36]. Optimal k-anonymity has been proved to be NP-hard for k ! 3. Much
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efforts have been seen on efficient k-anonymity algorithms [2,3,14,16,26,42,43], whereas
the safety of the algorithms is generally assumed. These algorithms render the data coarser
by generalizing the data to make it less specific, or suppress the data and perturb the data
to replace with a random value the actual value. A personalized requirement for anonymity
is studied in [55]. In [21], the authors approach the issue from a different perspective,
that is, the privacy property is based on generalization of the protected data and could be
customized by users.
Other models are proposed to address limitations of k-anonymity. A model based on
the intuition of blending individuals in a crowd is proposed in [46]. Many work focus on
the deficiency of allowing insecure groups with a small number of sensitive values, such as
l-diversity [34], t-closeness [31], alpha-k-anonymity [53], and so on. Machanavajjhala et
al. [34] proposed l-diversity as an important step beyond k-anonymity which overcomes the
shortcoming that an adversary can discover the sensitive value, when there is little diversity,
or through external knowledge. The model requires each equivalence class to have at least
l well-represented values for each sensitive attribute. The authors in [55] observe that l-
diversity cannot prevent attribute disclosure when multiple records in the table correspond
to one individual. They propose to have each individual specify privacy policies about
its own attributes. t-closeness is a privacy notion that requires that the distribution of a
sensitive attribute in any equivalence class to be close to the distribution of the attribute in
the overall table.
In [54], a data anonymitization approach divides one table into two parts for release; one
includes original quasi-identifiers and a group of id, and the other include the association
between the group id and the sensitive attribute values. In addition, a generic model called
GBP was proposed to unify the perspective of privacy guarantees in both generalization-
based publishing and view-based publishing [10]. In [9] and [8], the authors give the
privacy properties for micro-data disclosure when publication is based on multiple views
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since multiple views may reveal data privacy in a non-obvious way.
While most existing work assume the disclosed generalization to be the only source
of information available to an adversary, recent work [56] and [52] show the limitation of
such an assumption. In addition to such information, the adversary may also know about
the disclosure algorithm. With such extra knowledge, the adversary may deduce more
information and eventually violate the privacy property. In the work of [56] and [52], the
authors discover this issue and correspondingly introduce models and algorithms to address
it. However, the method in [52] depends on a specific privacy property, whereas the one




In this chapter, we first give motivating examples. We then briefly overview the system
architecture and discuss privacymetric that we choose for our system. Finally, we introduce
basic notations that will be used later in this thesis.
3.1 Motivating examples
Suppose the relationship between individuals and their disease names is considered sen-
sitive. Simply deleting the identity (Name) is not sufficient since a tuple’s sensitive value
may still be linked to a unique identity through the quasi-identifier(Age) when combined
with external knowledge, namely linking attack. We assume individuals can be identified
by their unique ages for this example (in general, the quasi-identifier is usually a combina-
tion of multiple attributes). Now suppose a query asks for information about those whose
age is between 32 to 60. The real answer of this query based on the database is shown as
A1 in Table 4, which is simply a relational table. Hiding the names in the answer will not
help to protect privacy, since the ages can still identify each individual.
For protecting privacy, the relationship between names (or ages) and diseases shown in
the real answer must be hidden. A simple solution we may immediately come up with is
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to give the answer that contain all the values but with the association between names and
diseases removed, shown as F 1 in Table 4. F 1 contains the same values for each attribute
as the real answer A1 does. However, it is shown as two independent relations (separated
by the double vertical lines). In each relation, the values are simply sorted in ascending
order. We call such a relation a fact. In this case, based on the released facts, adversaries
can only reason that any individual identity can be linked to one of the five diseases (since
there is one duplicate) among which each is equally likely to be that identity’s true disease.


























Table 4: Micro-data query auditing issues
However, simply hiding the relation is not enough to protect data privacy. Suppose the
second query is asked about those of an age between 30 to 50. The answer should be the
fact F 2 shown in Table 4. This answer seems to be safe since any identity can be linked
equally likely to a group of five diseases. However, this is not true if adversaries consider
the two query answers altogether. Combining F1 and F2, an adversary can easily deduce
that Alice has flu and George has HIV (consider “subtracting” F1 from F2 and vice versa).
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To protect privacy, the auditor must thus respond with a denial in order to prevent such a
situation.
We say this is the simple strategy for auditing, which denies a query if its answer will
lead to privacy breach. A flowchart illustrating the simple strategy is shown in Figure 1.
As shown in the figure, a query is sent to the database; the answer of this query is sent to
the auditor as one of the inputs to the strategy for making a decision as whether to give the
answer. In the figure, G stands for a knowledge dictionary which contains the information
about all previously released facts (that is, answers to queries). It is also one of the inputs
to the auditor’s strategy for making a decision. If the answer to current query combined
with the knowledge dictionary will violate privacy, a denial must be given instead of the
answer; otherwise, an answer is given.
Figure 1: The Simple Strategy
If we were to apply the simple strategy to the online auditing problem, a privacy breach
may become unavoidable. For example, suppose a new query asking for age between 40
to 50 is received after the system has released F1. After the auditor checks whether an-
swering this new query breaches data privacy, the auditor gives a denial, instead of F3, as
the response. As the adversary gets a denial, he/she would be able to deduce the disease
22
information of Bob and Clark as follows. The adversary first infers that the possible dis-
eases for Bob and Clark from F1 lead to 11 possible answers as shown in Table5. These 11
possible answers is combined by the known knowledge F1. Among the 11 combinations,
only one shows that Bob and Clark both have cancer. This is the only case where answer-
ing this new query is not safe, and thus a denial is given, if we assume 2-uncertainty as the
privacy property. Therefore, the denial itself tells the adversary that both Bob and Clark
must have cancer. The auditor has no choice at this time, since neither answering the query


































Table 5: The possible answers
To prevent the situation in which a denial will still breach privacy in online auditing,
another strategy, simulatable auditing [25] can be applied here. A simulatable auditor will
make decisions based on the query and knowledge from previously released answers only,
without referring to the actual database. If there exists a possibility to breach data privacy
by combining previously answered queries and the answer to the new query, regardless
of what the database might be, the new query should be denied by the auditor. To apply
simulatable auditing in our example, the auditor should give a denial to the query asking
for age between 40 to 50, since there exists the above possibility (a database in which Bob
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and Clark both have cancer) that breaches data privacy, even though the actual database
may be different.
The flowchart of the simulatable auditing strategy is shown in Figure 2. A query is sent
to the auditor. The auditor decides whether to answer this query based on the new query
and the knowledge dictionary. If it is impossible to breach data privacy by combining this
new query and previously released answers, regardless what the actual database is, then
the query will be sent to the database and an answer is given out. Otherwise, the query is
denied.
Figure 2: The Scenario of Simulatable Auduting Strategy
The simulatable strategy can protect data privacy. It, however, may be overly strict
in the sense that many safe queries may be denied. For example, suppose F1 (shown in
Table 6) has been released. The second query asks for Alice and Bob. By looking at F1,
we can see that the privacy of Alice and Bob may be breached, either when Alice and Bob
both may have cancer, or when they both have headache. Therefore, if we apply simulatable
auditing strategy here, we would give a denial as the answer to this query right away.
However, the privacy is actually not breached in this case, although simulatable auditing
says so, due to the following. There are more than one possibility for breaching privacy.
Now consider the simple strategy again. If Alice and Bob both have the same disease,
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any one of the above two, then the simple strategy will deny the query. The adversary
receiving this denial could learn that Alice and Bob both have cancer, or they both have
headache. Assuming the privacy property is that one identity must be associate with more
than one sensitive value, then this case does not violate the privacy property. Hence, it is
safe to check the actual database for this query, even though there do exist possibilities for
breaching data privacy.
In summary, the problem of simulatable auditing strategy is that it requires a denial to
never leak any information. However, a response of the auditor may actually leak informa-
tion, but that information does not breach the data privacy. In order to protect data privacy
and release more useful information, we should allow a denial to leak information as long
as it does not breach data privacy. The above example leads to the key observation of our
approach. That is, the set of all possible table instances, which match previously answered
queries and the new one, may be deemed as unsafe under the simulatable auditing strategy,
while it can actually satisfy the privacy property. Therefore, it is safe to release the answer
to the new query in such a case.
A question now naturally arises, that is, what exactly is the adversary’s knowledge
obtained from all answered queries and released facts. Suppose the two facts shown in
Table 6 (F 1 and F 2) have been released. F 1 and F 2 share some common identities. For
those common identities, the associated diseases must appear in both facts. Based on this,
we can easily obtain all possible disease values for each identity, as listed in Table 6.
To make decisions based on the simulatable auditing strategy, we should analyze the
knowledge dictionary together with the new query. For example, suppose another query
(Alice, Bob, Diana) is being asked. Consider the list of possible values. Suppose those
three identities all have the same disease: Alice, Bob and Diana all have flu, cancer, or
headache. Obviously, in any of these cases, the facts will breach data privacy, since all
three people’s disease will be the same. However, looking at F 1, we will see that these
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Alice flu, cancer, headache, pneumonia
Bob flu, cancer, headache, pneumonia
Clark flu, cancer, headache, pneumonia
Diana flu, cancer, headache
Ellen flu, cancer, headache
Fen flu, cancer, headache
George flu, cancer, headache, HIV
Helen flu, cancer, headache, HIV
Ian flu, cancer, headache, HIV
Table 6: An example showing the need for a meaingful knowledge dictionary
case are not possible, since in F 1 no disease name has appeared three times. That is, the
possible values of those identities are not independent, but are correlated. Therefore, the
above list is not convenient for the analysis, and we need a better model of adversaries’
knowledge.
3.2 Overview
The online auditing problem between an auditor and an adversary can be informally de-
scribed as the following. The adversary sends a series of queries in an attempt to breach
data privacy using responses from the auditor, whereas the auditor will audit all queries to
model the adversary’s knowledge, and deny queries if not doing so will allow the adversary
26
to breach data privacy using the knowledge and answers. At the same time, the auditor
would like to provide as many answers as possible, since the query may as well be from a
normal user instead of an adversary.
The high level architecture of the micro-database auditing system is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. A query (Query) is asked over a secret database (DB) by an outside user. To satisfy
a given privacy property, the auditor follows a strategy (Strategy) in processing the query.
A response (Response) to the query is sent to the outside user based on the strategy, a
knowledge dictionary (Knowledge Dictionary) that model all previous answered queries
and their answers, and/or the database. The auditor transforms all responses to a fact set







Figure 3: System Architecture
More formally, let T be a relational table consisting of n tuples. For simplicity we
consider one attribute of interest contain private information about individuals. A micro-
data query q specifies a subset of tuples in T . We consider the following online query
auditing problem: Queries q1, ..., qn−1 have already been received and the corresponding
answers a1, ..., an−1 have already been given, where each ai is either the correct answer to
the query qi, or “denied”, for i = 1, ..., n − 1; given a new query qn, decide whether to
return “denied” if answering the query will violate given privacy property, or the correct
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answer to qn, otherwise.
For privacy property, we follow the uncertainly concept introduced in [9]. The reason
we do not use !-diversity or k-anonymity is that in a micro-database, an adversary’s knowl-
edge about each identity in an anonymized group may be different, which renders these
privacy property proposed for single-view release inapplicable [9]. In our system, we name
the privacy property as !-uncertainty. !-uncertainty basically requires that any identity can
be deterministically associated with less than ! sensitive values in the secret table, where
an association is obtained based on all released facts and the answer to the new query.
Notice that this concept does not require identities to be grouped, as with k-anonymity or
l-diversity.
3.3 Notions and Notations
We useDB for a micro-database that contains relations where each relation T has n tuples
t1, t2..tn (n is a positive integer) under the schemaD=(ID,QI1, ..., QIi, S), where ID is an
attribute that is can be linked to an individual, such as Name or SSN;QI1, ..., QIi are quasi-
identifier attributes, such as Age, Address, and Occupation; S is an attribute containing
private information, such as medical conditions (in our discussions we shall limit our scope
such that there is only one sensitive attribute). As commonly assumed in the literature, the
relation T is considered as secret but its projections on ID,QI1, ..., QIi and that on S are
both publicly known.
A fact is a collection of two independent relations with the schema (ID,QI1, ..., QIi)
and (S), respectively. We use F to denote a set of facts F1, F2, .., Fl−1 that includes all
responses the system has given to previously asked queries q1, q2..ql−1 (we will not inves-
tigate the details of a query which can be in any suitable format). Use qj(T ) for the query
answer computed based on the secret table T for query qj . We use qj(T )[id] for the set
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of values of the ID attribute and qj(T )[s] for that of the S attribute. We use similar nota-
tions for the a fact Fj , that is, Fj[id] and Fj [s]. We also use Fj [id]1,Fj[id]2.. Fj [id]k and
Fj [s]1,Fj [s]2.. Fj[s]k to denote elements of the sets.
An instance I is a possible guess of the secret table T in the sense that regarding I as T
will not cause a conflict to any previously released fact in F . We useG for the knowledge
dictionary, which is the collection of all possible instances based on all released facts in F .
Initially, when no fact has been released from the database, the knowledge dictionary G
would simply include all one-to-one mapping from the projection of T on ID,QI1, ..., QIi





Fi, F A fact and the set of released facts
G Knowledge dictionary
I An instance
q, qi A query
q(T ), qi(T ) The real answer of a query
qi(T )[id], qi(T )[s] The projection of an answer on ID and S, respectively
Fi[id], Fi[s] The projection of a fact on ID and S, respectively




In this chapter, we shall present our simulatable strategy and discuss how the auditor can
make decisions while protecting data privacy by satisfying !-Uncertainty.
4.1 Overview
From our motivating examples, we have seen that denials may leak information to adver-
saries. Such a leakage happens when sensitive information flows from the database to
adversaries through the denials to queries. In other words, if a decision whether to answer
a query is made based on actual data in the database, then the decision itself may carry
information about that data.
A simple solution to the above information leakage problem is to not only deny a query
when answering it breaches data privacy, but also deny some safe queries that are randomly
chosen by the auditor. This solution prevents the leakage of information caused by denials
because the adversary will not knowwhether a denial is the result of protecting data privacy,
or simply a random choice. However, the solution may not be practical. The problem is
that the auditor must keep track of all randomly denied queries, since the adversary could
repeat a query for which the auditor is expected to give the same answer. Moreover, how
30
to determine whether two queries are asking for the same result is difficult.
The simulatable auditingmodel proposed in [25] takes a simpler approach. That is, only
previously answered queries and their answers are used to make decisions about whether
to answer a new query. Therefore, a denial of queries will not convey any information to
an adversary beyond what is already known from previous answered queries and answers.
Moreover, the denied queries will not count towards the adversary’s knowledge because
the denied queries will not leak any information and they would not change the decision
for following queries.
From the motivating examples, we know that when a new query’s answer leads to un-
safe possible instances of the secret database, those unsafe instances altogether may actu-
ally be safe. That is, although each such instance does not provide enough uncertainty, they
together do, since the adversary cannot determine which such instance indeed corresponds
to the secret database. Consequently, it is not necessary for a denial to leak absolutely no
information, as required by the simulatable auditing strategy, but instead a denial can leak
information but within a safe range.
The key difference between our proposed strategy and the simulatable auditing [25] is
that the decision to deny a query for leaking too much information, or to check database
for an answer, is independent of the actual database. Our auditor is simulatable since the
decision to check database or not is independent of the actual database, so the denial of a
query will not breach data privacy beyond what may have already been known based on
previous queries and answers.
Definition 1 An auditor is simulatable if the decision to deny a query or check the
database for an answer is only based on previously disclosed information, but not the
actual database. The previously disclosed information here include all queries and their
corresponding answers, as encoded in the knowledge dictionary.
Our general strategy works as follows: We compute all possible answers to the new
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query ql using knowledge dictionary alone, without referring to the actual database. For
each of these possible answers, we check if privacy is breached based on the !-uncertainty
privacy property. We then combine all unsafe answers and check if they together breach
privacy. If this is indeed the case, the query will be denied. Otherwise, the query will be
sent to the database to compute the answer. If the answer breaches data privacy, the query
is denied; the query is answered, otherwise.
4.2 The Strategy
We now design our simulatable auditor. In a database with n secret records, a new query
asks for information about a subset of the records. Given a set of previously answered
queries q1, ..., ql−1 and their corresponding responses f1, ..., fl−1, and the new query ql,
the simulatable auditor must deny ql if answering it breaches the data privacy. That is,
considering all potential answers to this query, if the collection of all possible instances
of ql does not satisfy !-uncertainty, then this new query should be denied. Notice that in
this step, the decision to deny a query or not is independent of the actual database and the
real answer to the new query, since we have not referred to either of them. Then, if the
query is not denied after this step, then we would check the database and its real answer. If
the answer would breach data privacy, the query will still be denied. Otherwise, it will be
answered.
Notice that the response from a database auditor is either the real answer computed
based on the database, or a denial for protecting data privacy. We now consider how a real
answer satisfying !-uncertainty is related to a fact (that is, a collection of separate rela-
tions, as defined in the previous chapter). Because the association between those separate
relations in a fact has been removed and those relations have the same size, a fact itself
satisfies !-uncertainty if the relation containing sensitive values include ! distinct values.
We have seen that when a fact is disclosed, the knowledge that an adversary can deduce
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is usually more than what the fact itself contains. Such knowledge can be modeled as the
updated knowledge dictionary (that is, the model of a set of all possible instances of the
secret database based on the information disclosed so far) with this new fact taken into
consideration. Therefore, we emphasize that when we say a fact satisfies !-uncertainty, it
implies that not only the fact itself satisfies !-uncertainty but also the updated knowledge
dictionary does. More precisely, we say the knowledge dictionary satisfies !-uncertainty
if every identity can be associated with at least ! distinct sensitive values among all possi-
ble instances of the secret database. We will delay the discussion of updating knowledge
dictionary in next section.
Given the two inputs, a new query ql and the current knowledge dictionary G, the
auditor must make a decision as whether to check the database or to deny the query. First
of all, the secret table must be one of the possible instances modeled by the knowledge
dictionary. Assuming it is the instance I, the new query ql that asks for information about
I is safe to forward to the database, if its corresponding fact does not breach data privacy
and the updated knowledge dictionary, with this query answered, would not breach data
privacy, either. We can check each possible database instance in the knowledge dictionary
against the privacy property. More formally, we have the following.
Definition 2 (!-Uncertainty Safe Instance) Given the knowledge dictionaryG computed
from the set of previously disclosed facts F , and a new query ql, we say a table instance I (I
∈ G) is !-uncertainty safe, denotes as !SI(I|ql,G), if F ′ = ql(I) and the new knowledge
dictionary computed fromG and F ′ are both safe.
In Definition 2, the condition for an instance to be !-uncertainty safe is for the fact re-
sulted from the new query, and the new knowledge dictionary resulted from releasing this
fact to both satisfy !-uncertainty. As we have discussed, we can determine whether a fact
satisfies !-uncertainty simply based on whether the fact includes at least ! distinct sensitive
values. In order to determine whether a knowledge dictionary satisfies !-uncertainty, we
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need to count the number of distinct sensitive values that are assoicated with each iden-
tity among all possible instances. For example, suppose there are ten identities and the
knowledge dictionary represents a group of ten instances. If all identities are associated
with exactly five distinct sensitive values, except one identity to only two distinct sensitive
values, then we say this knowledge dictionary only satisfies !-Uncertainty with !=2.
Next, the auditor will collect all instances that are unsafe for answering the new query,
and will try to determine whether it is safe to go to the secret database to compute the real
answer. Here an unsafe instance is one modeled in the knowledge dictionary to which a
denial may breach data privacy. In other words, if this instance is indeed the secret table,
then denying the new query after applying the strategy will breach the data privacy. For
example, suppose there exists only one instance that is unsafe with respect to !-uncertainty
among the set of all possible instances, and suppose after we check the database we find
that the real answer must not be given, then at this time a denial will immediately tell
adversaries that this unsafe instance is indeed the secret database.
More precisely, with given knowledge dictionary G and a new query ql, the query
separates current knowledge dictionary to two parts, based on whether an instance is !-
uncertainty safe. Let &(ql,G, !) be the set of unsafe instances, that is, &(ql,G, !) =
{Ii|Ii ∈ G,¬!SI(Ii|ql,G)|}. As we know, the knowledge dictionary models all possible
database instances, so the complement of the set of unsafe instances with respect to the
knowledge dictionary will be the set of instances that satisfy !-uncertainty property, which
we shall denote as ∇(ql,G, !).
Now we look more closely at how a denial may breach data privacy. From the previ-
ously examples, we learned that a denial breaches privacy when the adversary infers that
the secret table must belong to the set of unsafe instances, &(ql,G, !); if this set itself
breaches data privacy, then the denial would also do so. By saying this set breaches data
privacy, we mean that there will be less than ! distinct sensitive values associated with at
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least one identity across all instances in this set. For example, among all instances in set
&(ql,G, !), suppose we always have either a = S1 or a = S2, then the privacy of identity
a will be breached if we assume !=3. Note that this is true, even though the adversary is not
really given the query answer, but only knows the real database is in the set&(ql,G, !).
One may ask a similar question about the set of safe instances, that is, whether the set
of safe instances may also breach data privacy so it is not safe for an adversary to infer
that the actual instance is in this set using the responses. However, the answer is always no
according to Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 Adversarial knowledge of T ∈ ∇(ql,G, !) does not breach data privacy.
Proof: By Definition 2, for any instance I ∈ ∇(ql,G, !), the new dictionary Gn computed
from the query answer ql(I) and previous knowledge dictionary G is !-uncertainty safe.
By the definition of knowledge dictionary, we know that for any I ′ ∈ Gn (including I), I ′
is a possible instance in the sense that assuming I ′ to be the real database will not cause
any conflict to the query answer ql(I), that is, ql(I) = ql(I ′). Since the new knowledge
dictionary Gn is computed based on the query answer ql(I) and previous knowledge dic-
tionaryG, which are both identical for I and I ′, we have that I and I ′ must both lead to the
same new knowledge dictionary Gn, which is !-uncertainty safe. Therefore, all instances
in Gn are !-uncertainty safe, that is, we have Gn ⊆ ∇(ql,G, !). Also, the new knowledge
dictionary of an instance actually forms an equivalence relation over∇(ql,G, !). Since any
such equivalence class must satisfy !-uncertainty, ∇(ql,G, !) must do so, too, because the
number of distinct sensitive values that can be associated with each identity will increase
monotonically in the number of possible instances. This concludes the proof. "
Next, to prevent a denial from breaching privacy, the auditing system must make the
decision as whether to check the database in a simulatable manner. That is, the decision
should be made in a way that adversaries can potentially repeat the process by themselves.
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Note that from the above discussions, we have not referred to the real database in determin-
ing whether the set of safe and unsafe instances. This means our method is indeed simulat-
able. Therefore, it would be sufficient for the auditor to only access the real database when
the set&(ql,G, !) satisfies !-uncertainty property.
First of all, we use )&(ql,G, !)* to denote the least number of distinct sensitive values
associated with each identities among all possible instances in (the union of) all knowl-
edge dictionaries. We can thus compare this number with the privacy property ! to decide
whether a denial would breach privacy and whether we should go to check the real database.
For example, assuming there are three instances I1, I2, I3 in the set &(ql,G, !) for query
ql. In the data dictionary of I1, we have a = S1; in that of I2, we have a = S2; for I3 we
have a = S1. Then we have )&(ql,G, !)* equal to 2. In summary, we have the following
definition and result.
Definition 3 (!-Uncertainty Safe Query) Given the knowledge dictionary G computed
from the set of facts F and given a new query ql, we say query ql is !-uncertainty safe,
denotes as !SQ(ql,G), if )&(ql,G, !)* ≥ !.
Lemma 2 Denying a query when a query is !-uncertainty safe will not breach data privacy.
The notion of !-uncertainty safe query is to determine if the auditor can safely access the
actual database. From lemma 2, we know that if the set &(ql,G, !) satisfies !-uncertainty
property, to access database and give out a denial does not breach data privacy. This means
to determine whether a query is !-uncertainty safe query discloses the same information
as a denial of this query. That is, the denial will not allow an adversary to associate any
identity to less than ! distinct sensitive values. For this purpose, we will check whether
)&(ql,G, !)* is less than ! by looking at all instances in the set and count vertically to
make sure every identity has ! distinct sensitive values.
In computing the number of associations between identities and sensitive values, an
identity must appear in all the instances of &(ql,G, !). If an identity does not appear in
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one instance, then this identity can basically be ignored in determining privacy breaches
since the identity could potentially be associated with any sensitive value in the domain.
That is, if there are n unsafe instances in&(ql,G, !) and one identity only appears in n− 1
instances, then this identity may take any sensitive value (in the nth instance).
The algorithm for checking whether a query is !-uncertainty safe is shown below.
Algorithm 1 !-Uncertainty Safe Query Checking
Input: Knowledge dictionaryG and a new query ql
Output: True or False
1: for each I ∈ G
2: if I is not !SI(I|ql,G)
3: insert I into&(ql,G, !);
5: end if
6: end for
7: for each id ∈ &(ql,G, !);
8: count how many sensitive values to which the id could be assigned;
9: end for





After a query passes !-uncertainty checking, the auditor can access the actual database.
The actual database could be either an instance in set&(ql,G, !) or that in set ∇(ql,G, !)
(recall that we have not accessed the actual database so far). If the database is in set
&(ql,G, !), the query cannot be safely answered since the answer will not satisfy !-uncertainty
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property. Therefore, a denial will be given. Notice that this denial is different from the pre-
vious one in what causes the denial. We define the !-uncertainty simulatable strategy in the
following.
Definition 4 (!-Uncertainty Simulatable Strategy) Given the knowledge dictionary G
and a new query ql, ql will be answered unless if
• it is not !-uncertainty safe query, or
• Fl violates !-uncertainty property
As shown in Figure 4, a query may be denied at two different stages. First, a query may
be denied at the simulatable auditing stage if the denying the query may lead to privacy
breaches. Notice that the decision of this denial is independent of the actual database. That
is, a query may be denied, if though its answer computed based on the actual database may
be safe. This auditing is simulatable since adversaries may obtain the same decision by
themselves. Second, the actual database is used to make the decision, and a query will
be denied if the answer itself will lead to privacy breaches. This step is not simulatable
since the decision will depend on the actual database. Therefore, a denial at this stage will
disclose information to adversaries, and the knowledge dictionary will need to be updated
(we will discuss the update of knowledge dictionary in next chapter).
Figure 4: The Scenario of !-uncertainty Simulatable Strategy
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The strategy can be more precisely described as the algorithm below. It takes a knowl-
edge dictionary and new query as inputs, and outputs either a denial or answer to the query.
The algorithm will return a denial at either line 3 or line 8, corresponding the two cases
discussed above. The knowledge dictionary will be updated in the latter case since the de-
nial does disclose information to adversaries. Finally, if the query can be safely answered,
the answer will be returned at line 10, and the knowledge dictionary will be updated with
the released fact.
Algorithm 2 !-Uncertainty Simulatable Strategy
Input: Knowledge dictionaryG and a new query ql
Output: Denial, or an answer to ql




5: //access the actual database to compute the answer
6: Fl = ql(T);
7: if Fl violates !-uncertainty
8: return denial and updateG;
9: else






In this chapter, we describe some extended work. First, we study how to compute and
maintain the knowledge dictionary. Then, we investigate how queries may be delayed or
denied in a combined manner in order to improve data utility in the sense that more queries
may be safely answered.
5.1 Knowledge Dictionary
In this section, we discuss how to generate the knowledge dictionary and update it while
more queries are either denied or answered.
We need a knowledge dictionary to capture adversarial knowledge about possible in-
stances when making decisions on new queries. To consider computing the knowledge
dictionary, we consider three states of the auditing system, that is, system initial, the first
query, and the following queries.
• When the auditing system first initiates and no query has been received, the knowl-
edge dictionary can be used to model public domain knowledge of the database. For
example, such domain knowledge can be modeled as the Cartesian product of the
domain of public and sensitive attributes, respectively. For a medical database, this
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may be the product of a population list and a list of disease names. This means
that nothing has been given out at the system initial time so an adversary would not
be able to make any inferences. The knowledge dictionary will include all possible
pairings between of each public and sensitive attribute value.
• Now consider the first received query. Since the knowledge dictionary at the system
initial will typically not breach the data privacy, the first query can be answered as
long as the corresponding fact is safe, that is, the number of unique sensitive value
it contains is greater than !. The adversary knows the strategy and knows that if
the query asks for a smaller set of values it will get denied and no information will
be disclosed. Consequently, after the first answer is given, be it the real answer or
a denial, the knowledge dictionary will be either be replaced by a real answer, or
remain unchanged in case it is a denial. This case is thus obvious since the answer
itself is the only information that is being disclosed to the adversary.
• When following queries are received, how to update the knowledge dictionary will
depend on at which stage an answer or denial is given by the strategy. We will study
how different updating actions should be taken at different stages of a strategy in the
following.
Updating the knowledge dictionary after queries are either denied or answered by the
system is the most important step in preventing data privacy disclosure. From last section,
we know that the strategy may give a response to a query at three different stages, a denial
if the query itself is not safe, a denial if the query’s answer is not safe according to the real
database, or an answer if the query can be safely answered. For simplicity, we shall call the
first denial negative denial and the second positive denial. Different stages require different
updating methods, as we shall enumerate next and illustrate in Figure 5.
• Negative Denial. The negative denial stage is a simulatable stage. When the number
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of unique sensitive values associated with each identifier among the set of unsafe
instances&(q, G,! ) is less than !, the strategy will give a denial. This step is simu-
latable in the sense that an adversary may obtain the same result by himself/herself,
with the knowledge of the current knowledge dictionary and the new query. The ad-
versary thus could not infer anything from this denial and the knowledge dictionary
will also remain unchanged after a negative denial is given.
For example, suppose an adversary asks a query for those with an age greater than or
equal to 50 while he/she has the knowledge F1 shown in Table 4. The system should
give a denial since there is only one chance to breach data privacy in which Alice
and Bob both have cancer. After this negative denial is given, the adversary cannot
infer any information. Hence, the knowledge dictionary will remain unchanged. As
shown in Figure 5.a, the knowledge dictionary (as the circle indicates) and unsafe set
(the shadowed portion). The number of sensitive values in the unsafe set is less than
!. The negative denial is thus the response. Figure 5.d shows the updated knowledge
dictionary, which is not changed. The real database state may or may not be in
&(q, G,! ).
• Positive Denial. The positive denial stage uses the real database to compute the an-
swer to a new query in order to determine whether this answer violates !-uncertainty
property. To reach the decision of checking for the real answer of this query, the
prerequisite is that )&(q, G,! )* greater or equal to !. From the adversary’s point
of view, after this denial is seen, he/she knows the real database must be inside set
&(q, G,! ), The knowledge dictionary will thus change to&(q, G,! ).
For example, suppose the adversary has the knowledge F1 (as shown in Table 8)
and asks for a query about Alice and Bob. Suppose !=2 and the system gives a
denial. After the adversary sees this denial, he/she knows that it must be a positive
denial since there have are possibilities for breaching the data privacy, that is, either
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Alice and Bob both have cancer, or Alice and Bob both have headache. This denial
must thus come from the real database, and one of these possibilities corresponds
to the real database. Therefore, the new knowledge dictionary for Alice and Bob
will change to these two cases. Figure Figure 5.b and Figure 5.e show this case.
Figure 5.b is the knowledge dictionary and the shadowed portion is the unsafe set for
the new query. Figure 5.e is the updated knowledge dictionary.
• Answer. If an answer does not breach data privacy at the previous stage, then the real
answer will be given out. The knowledge dictionary will be updated according to the














Table 8: Updating knowledge dictionary
For the same example as above, if the answer {cancer, flu} is given for Alice and
Bob, the knowledge dictionary will be updated such that Alice and Bob can only
have cancer or flu. Note that an answer may affect other parts of the knowledge
dictionary, since in F1 all identities are equally likely to have one of the six disease,
while after the answer is given, two of the six diseases can no longer be associated to
the rest of the identities. The new knowledge dictionary is shown as V1 and V2. Note
that we are using a simplified example here; for more general cases, the updating
will not be so straightforward. We will discuss more details later. Figure Figure 5.c
and Figure 5.f illustrate this case. Figure 5.c is the knowledge dictionary and the
shadowed portion is the unsafe set corresponding to the new query. Figure 5.f is the
updated knowledge dictionary.
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Figure 5: Updating knowledge dictionary
Since a response from the auditing system, which is either an answer to the query or
a denial, can only cause some possible instances in the current knowledge dictionary to
become impossible and removed, we have the following straightforward result.
Lemma 3 The size of the knowledge dictionary will decrease monotonically as more and
more queries are processed by the auditing system.
To update the knowledge dictionary with a new fact, there exist three cases. In the
first, the identities in the new fact do not appear in the knowledge dictionary. For updating
the latter, we shall add the new fact to the knowledge dictionary. In the second case, the
identities in the new fact correspond to part of one of the views (the concept of a view will
be defined shortly) in the knowledge dictionary, such as in the examples shown below. To
update the knowledge dictionary, we shall separate that view to two views. In the third
case, the identities in the new fact involve part of (multiple) views, which will be discussed
in the following. The algorithm for updating knowledge dictionary is shown below.
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Algorithm 3 Updating Knowledge Dictionary
Input: knowledge dictionaryG, response(ND, PD, Fl)
Output: New knowledge dictionaryG
1: if ND; //Negative denial
2: return G;
3: end if
4: if PD; //Positive denial
5: return&(q, G,! );
6: end if
7: if Fl is given;
8: if Fl[id] overlapped withG[id];







To incorporate a new fact whose identities overlap with multiple facts in the knowledge
dictionary, we need to separate the intersections to separate views. Here a view is similar
to a fact, but specifically refers to one in the knowledge dictionary. We shall use view set
to denote the set of views in a knowledge dictionary whose lists of identities are always
mutually disjoint. If we see each view as two separate lists, one of identity values and the
other of sensitive values, then identity value lists of all the views in a view set are always
disjoint. Intuitively, we can regard views as smaller facts with their intersections separated
into new views. Similar to a fact, a view means each sensitive value may be associated to
any identity in the view. A straightforward result is that the size of a view set will always
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be larger than or equal to the size of the corresponding fact set.













Table 9: Updating knowledge dictionary for multiple facts
An example is given in Table 9. In the given two facts F1 and F2, the two lists of
identities have 3 common values {Diana, Ellen, Fen}, while those of the sensitive attribute
have four common values {flu, cancer, headache, headache}. This phenomenon is caused
by the identical sensitive values that appear in the two facts. Obviously, only three out of
the four common sensitive values can be associated with the three common identity values.
We shall call the sensitive values {flu, cancer, headache, headache} the possible values
for {Diana, Ellen, Fen} since we cannot determine which of those values can really be
associated with the identities. However, by examining the possible combinations of values,
we can see that ’headache’ here will always be associated with one of the three identities.
We say such a value is determined. In a special case, if the intersection of the identity lists
and that of the sensitive attribute both have the same size, then we can easily see that all the
sensitive values are determined. We now convert the two facts shown above into the view
set shown in Table 10.















Table 10: Views in a knowledge dictionary
There are three views in this view set. The italic font denotes that the sensitive values
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are only possible values in the view. In V1 and V3, one of the three sensitive values will
belong to this view. In V2, two of the three sensitive values will belong to it. These possible
values inside each view are interdependent. For example, if the adversary has any reason to
believe that the value flu should be associated with one of {D,E, F}, then he can say that
flu is determined in V2, while for V1 and V3, flu will be removed from the list of possible
values.
When a new fact (the answer to a new query) is released, recall that we need to inter-
sect it with every view in the knowledge dictionary in order to update the latter, as shown in
Table 9. However, the aforementioned dependency relationship between views would pre-
vent such an update since the sensitive values in different views will depend on each other.
Therefore, we first break this relationship by converting the views that contain possible
values into sets of views that only contain determined values, by enumerating all possible
combinations. For example, in Table 10, the result of breaking the dependent relationship
between the three views will lead to (32) different sets of views, as shown in Table 11. Since
now all views inside each set only contain determined vales, we can then intersect the new




























Table 11: Sets of Views
To intersect a new fact (the answer to a new query) with each set of views, it is con-
venient to organize these views by levels as follows. Suppose currently the knowledge
dictionary is the result of releasing totally n facts. Then, we place the view that is the result
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of intersecting all the n facts at the top level. Then, the views placed at the second level
will be the intersection between each set of (n− 1) facts, and there are at most (nn−1) such
views at this level. Clearly, there can be at most n levels and∑ni=1(ni ) views. As shown
in Figure 6, we denote those views using integers with larger numbers at a higher level
(the order between views at the same level is not important) where ρ(f)ni denotes the first
number at level i (which is equal to∑i−1j=1(nj ) + 1) and ρ(l)ni the last at that level (which




j )). Note that there could be much less views in practice since
many facts may have an empty intersection.
Figure 6: Organizing views by levels
When we intersect a new fact with the views organized as above. We can compute
the intersections level by level, from top to the bottom, and the result can then be easily
organized in a similar way, as depicted more clearly in the algorithm below.
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Algorithm 4 Updating Overlapping Views
Input: The knowledge dictionaryG, a new fact Fl+1
Output: The updated knowledge dictionaryG
1: generate sets of views by breaking the dependency relationship among views inG;





3: for each set of views;
4: for i = l to 1






7: Update Fl+1 and Vρ(f)l+1
i
+k







In this section, we study the issue of auditing multiple queries received at the same time,
namely, concurrent queries. Concurrent queries can be checked in any order, since there is
no inherent order among those queries. The auditing system should select an order among
queries in order to answer as many queries as possibly allowed by the privacy requirement
under a strategy. Therefore, we need to answer following two questions.
• Does the order of checking concurrent queries affect their answers, and if so, can this
dependency relationship breach the data privacy?
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• How can wemaximize the number of concurrent queries that can be safely answered?
First, consider an example of answering concurrent queries by following the !-uncertainty
strategy. Assuming two concurrent queries(q1, q2) are received at the same time. q1 asks
for the disease information about those whose age is less then 35, whereas q2 asks for in-
formation about those whose age is larger and equal to 40. The adversary has already the
knowledge about F1 shown in Table 12. Applying !-uncertainty strategy here, we consider
first checking query q1 and then q2. The query q1 gets a negative denial since Ellen and
Fen may have the same disease. Then, query q2 gets answered with {cancer, cancer, flu}
(assuming the privacy requirement is !=2).
However, if we take the reversed order in checking these two queries, q2 and then q1,
then these two queries will both get answered. First, query q2 will get answered with {can-
cer,cancer,flu}, and the knowledge dictionary changes to G2 as shown in Table 12. Then,
query q1 will get answered with {pneumonia, gastritis}, since it is impossible that Ellen
and Fen would have the same disease cancer according to G2. The knowledge dictionary
will then be updated to G3 (shown in Table 12). This example shows that different orders
in checking concurrent queries may indeed lead to different results.
The above example shows that different orders may affect the result of auditing concur-
rent queries. The reason is that an answer not only depends on the query itself, but also the
knowledge dictionary, which will in turn depend on the queries that have been answered
before the present one, as described in Lemma 4. However, the order will not matter in a
special case where only negative denials are given. This is because a negative denial will
not cause the knowledge dictionary to be updated, as we mentioned before. Therefore, if
all queries get a negative denial as the answer, then an answer will not depend on howmany
other such queries have been answered before this query.
Lemma 4 Different orders in checking a set of concurrent queries may lead to different






























Table 12: Example of Concurrent Queries
case the order does not matter.
Next, we consider whether a denied query can be safely answered by changing the order
of auditing concurrent queries. First, we have the following result for positive denials.
Lemma 5 If qi gets a positive denial as the answer, then qi will still be denied even if more
queries are checked before it.
Proof: Consider a set of concurrent queries Q={q1, .., qn}. First of all, a positive denial
implies the following.
• )&(qi,G, !)* > !, that is, the number of sensitive values in the unsafe set of query
qi must be larger than !;
• DB ∈ &(qi,G, !), that is, the real database must belong to the unsafe set;
• The new knowledge dictionary Gi will be updated to&(qi,G, !).
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We know that the above second fact will not change even if more queries are checked
before qi, whereas the first fact may or may not change. Therefore, qi will either lead to a
positive denial (if the first fact becomes untrue) or a negative denial. "
Before we examine the case of negative denials, we build intuitions through an example
shown in Table13. Suppose the fact F1 shown in Table12 is released and a query q1 is
asked about Ellen and Fen. There are 16 (selecting 2 out of 7 then minus 5 since there
are two identical values) possible answers for q1. In this set of possible answers, only one
answer could breach the assumed 2-uncertainty property. Set &(q1,G, !) that includes
120 instances could lead to this unsafe answer in which both Ellen and Fen have cancer.
Therefore, the auditor gives a negative denial, and the knowledge dictionary will remain
the same. Now suppose another query q2 is asked, the answer will be given, since no
unsafe answer exists, and then the knowledge dictionary is updated as shown in Table 13.
Then, suppose the same query q1 is asked again. With the updated knowledge dictionary,
the unsafe answer will actually no longer be a possible instance. The number of possible
answers for q1 are thus reduced to 6, and all these answers turn out to be safe with respect
to 2-uncertainly property. Therefore, q1 can be answered now.
Lemma 6 When a query qi leads to a negative denial, qi may be answered if more queries
are checked before qi.
Proof: Suppose query qi gets a negative denial as the answer. This negative denial implies
that among instances in set &(qi,G, !), there must exist at least one identity ID that is
associated to !′(!′ < !) sensitive values S1, S2, . . . , Sl′ . Also, we know that the knowledge
dictionary will remain the same after this response. If another query qj is asked before qi
and gets answered, then we know that the knowledge dictionary will be updated to include
less instances, that is, some possible instances would need to be removed due to the answer.
It is thus possible that those instances that contain the association between ID and sensitive
values S1, S2, . . . , Sl′ are altogether removed. Therefore, qi would now be answerable. "
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q1(Diana,Ellen) q2(Alice,Bob, Clark) q1(Diana,Ellen)
# of Possible answers 16 25 6
Unsafe answer(s) Diana cancerEllen cancer
&(qi,G, !) 120 ∅ ∅
)&(qi,G, !)*
1 (Diana has cancer
Ellen has cancer) 2 2























Table 13: Examples of Negative Denial (! = 2)
Now we know that only negative denials will cause the results of queries checked in
different orders to vary. From our discussions in previous sections, we also know that
negative denials are the result of a simulatable auditing algorithm, that is, an adversary may
obtain the same results by himself/herself. If the auditing system checks a set of concurrent
queries in an order that maximizes the number of answered queries, then the results would
also be simulatable, and therefore, safe. We thus have the following straightforward result.
Theorem 7 Given a set of concurrent queries Q, it is safe to answer Q′ ⊆ Q such that
| Q′ | is the maximum possible for satisfying the privacy requirement.
The naive way for maximizing the number of answerable queries is to check the queries
in all possible orders. However, based on the previous discussions, this process can be
optimized as shown in the below algorithm. First, we separately check each query using
the current knowledge dictionary, and we divide these queries into three groups based on
their answers, that is, the answerable, negative denials, and positive denials. We then check
queries in different orders within the answerable group and choose the optimal order which
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yields the greatest number of answers. Then, we process the positive denial group in which
queries shall all get a denial as the answer but will update the knowledge dictionary. Finally,
with the updated knowledge dictionary, we then process the negative denial group and
output the answers.
Algorithm 5 Checking Concurrent Query
Input: a set of concurrent queries {q1, .., qn}, knowledge dictionaryG, !
Output: Query answers
1: Check all queries using the !-uncertainty strategy and group them into three groups
A (Answerable), ND (Negative denials), and PD (Positive denials)
2: Determine the optimal order for answering A and place queries leading to denials
into ND and PD;
3: Check PD and update G
4: While ND -= φ
5: Check ND
6: End while
5.3 !-Uncertainty Delay and Joint Strategy
Now we consider possible variations of the basic strategy that can potentially improve data
utility. The key observation is that within the aforementioned strategy, the negative denial
stage employs a simulatable method in making the denial decision for a query, which means
the decision may not be justified by the real database. This simulatable method certainly
preserves data privacy but it will also have a greater impact on data utility.
By Lemma 6, we can then come up with a possible way for improving data utility. That
is, when a query gets a negative denial as the answer, it may become answerable if some
other queries are answered first since those instances that cause this query to be denied may
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be removed from set &(q, G,! ) when additional answers cause the knowledge dictionary
to be updated. This is of course under a necessary condition that is the actual database
state must not be inside set &(q, G,! ). Otherwise, if the actual database state is inside set
&(q, G,! ), then by previous discussions we know that the real database always stays in G
and&(q, G,! ) no matter how many queries are answered.
For improving the data utility, we extend the basic strategy to a new strategy called
!-uncertainty delay strategy, as described in below definition and illustrated in Figure 7.
Definition 5 (!-Uncertainty-Delay Strategy) Given the knowledge dictionary G com-
puted from previously released facts F{F1, .., Fl−1}, a new query ql and a delayed query
ql′ , the !-uncertainty delay strategy will
• delay ql, iff ¬!SQ(ql, G);
deny ql, iff DB ∈ &(ql, G, !);
answer ql, otherwise.
• answer ql′ , iff&(ql′, G, !) = ∅;
delay ql′ , otherwise.
As shown in Figure , the scenario of !-uncertainty delay strategy is similar to that of
!-uncertainty simulatable strategy. There are also three stages for giving a response to a
new query. However, instead of giving a negative denial, the auditing system will place the
query into a queue and mark it as being delayed. When the knowledge dictionary has been
updated after answering some other queries, the delayed queries will be checked again for
possible answers.
Taking the adversary’s point of view, when a denied query is answered after several
other queries are answered, the adversary cannot breach data privacy since the strategy
already take this into consideration. The only information that this answer will convey
to the adversary is that set &(ql, G, !) does not contain the real database instance. Also,
55
Figure 7: The Scenario of !-uncertainty-Delay Strategy
since this new strategy may eventually answer some queries that would be denied under
the previous strategy, the data utility can potentially be improved. Therefore, we have the
following straightforward result.
Lemma 8 !-uncertainty-delay strategy satisfies the !-uncertainty property and has no worse
data utility than !-uncertainty strategy.
On the other hand, waiting for one or more queries whose answers will remove unsafe
instances from set &(ql, G, !) is a passive approach. We now consider a more active ap-
proach for the same goal of improving the data utility. We explain the approach through an
example in the following.
Suppose query qa has received a negative denial as the answer, and qa has been denied
because its answer will allow adversaries to know a = s1 or a = s2 (assuming !=3).
Also suppose some queries have been processed since then, and the knowledge dictionary
has been updated; however, the instances unsafe for qa have not been removed by those
answers. At this point, the auditing system cannot allow qa to check its answer against the
real database by the !-uncertainty delay strategy; the system will thus continue to delay the
query.
However, suppose among those queries, another query qb also gets a negative denial
since it allows the adversary to know that a = s2 and a = s3. Since each of these two
56
negatively denied queries associates two possible sensitive values to the same identity, a
natural question to ask is whether we can combine them to yield a scenario where the
identity is associated with three possible sensitive values, which are a = s1, a = s2, and
a = s3, and thus the data privacy requirement is satisfied (!=3) and both q1 and q2 can be
answered. This approach would further improve data utility.
Based on this intuition, we define a strategy, called the !-uncertainty joint strategy. In
this strategy, we create a waiting pool to store all the negatively denied queries. In the
waiting pool, every query would have an answer that associates less than ! sensitive values
with an identity. However, once the total number of )&(qi, G, !)* for some of the queries in
the waiting pool becomes greater than ! (we shall call such a set of queries joint queries),
we forward them to the real database to check for the answer. We give all the answers
altogether only if they all satisfy !-uncertainty property at the same time; we deny all the
joint queries, otherwise. Taking the adversary’s point of view again, if we give a denial to
one of the joint queries whose answer does not satisfy the privacy property, the adversary
can infer that the actual database state must be in set &(qi, G, !) whose size is less then !.
Therefore, in this case, we should deny all the joint queries if only at least one of them gets
a denial.
To see why the data privacy is not breached when the auditing system denies a set of
joint queries as described above, consider Figure 8. In the figure, queries q1, q2, and q3
are joint queries that can collectively pass the negative denial check. If we either deny
or answer all the queries at the same time, the knowledge dictionary will change to the
illustrated union in which the privacy property is satisfied.
One subtlety is that in determining whether a set of joint queries satisfy a privacy prop-
erty, we must ensure all the queries are considered at the same time against each instance.
For example, suppose a = s1 is true for instance I1 under query qa, a = s2 for instance
I2 under query qa, b = s1 for instance I1 under query qa, and b = s2 for instance I2 under
57
Figure 8: Knowledge dictionary for joint queries
query qb. Suppose these two queries are joint queries, and we need to determine whether
they satisfy the privacy property of !=3. It might seem that the property is satisfied since
altogether there are four different possiblities for a and b to be associated with sensitive
values. However, a closer look will reveal the opposite, since either a = s1 and b = s1 is
true with I1 being the real database, or a = s2 and b = s2 is true with I2. Therefore, the
privacy property is not satisfied with ! = 3.
Another issue is that since an originally denied query may benefit from being pushed
into the waiting pool, it might seem probable that a query that is to be denied by the delay
strategy may be pushed into the waiting pool such that it would have a second chance.
However, delaying such a query may breach the data privacy. Assume a series of queries
qa, .., qa+x, qb, .., qb+y are already in the waiting pool and we have )&(qa+i, G, !*) # ! hold
for 0 ≤ i ≤ x, and also∑xi=0)&(qa+i, G, !)*+
∑y
j=0)&(qb+j, G, !)* > ! is true.
Now suppose these queries have been denied after check with the real database. We
thus have DB ∈ &(qa, G, !) ∪ .. ∪ &(qa+x, G, !) ∪ &(qb, G, !) ∪ .,∪&(qb+y, G, !). Sup-
pose now we again push these queries into the waiting pool, and another series of queries
{qc, .., qc+zqc, .., qc+z} are then pushed into the waiting pool. The auditing system finds
58
that the set of queries qa, .., qa+x, qc, .., qc+z are safe to check the real database. Now, a
denial will not breach the data privacy, since either DB ∈ &(qa, G, !) ∪ .. ∪ &(qa+x, G, !)
or DB ∈ &(qc, G, !) ∪ .. ∪ &(qc+z, G, !) must true. However, answering the queries
will breach the data privacy, since DB ∈ &(qb, G, !) ∪ .. ∪ &(qb+y, G, !) implies that
)&(qb, G, !)* ∪ .. ∪ )&(qb+y, G, !)* # ! must be true. Therefore, pushing already denied
queries back into the waiting pool may breach the data privacy.
Based on the above discussions, we now define the !-uncertainty joint strategy as shown
below and illustrated in Figure 9.
Definition 6 (!-uncertainty-Joint Strategy) Given the knowledge dictionary G com-
puted from previously released facts F{F1, .., Fl−1}, a new query ql, and the waiting pool
{qa, .., qb}, the !-uncertainty-Joint Strategy will
• push ql into the waiting pool, iff ¬!SQ(ql, G);
deny ql, iff DB ∈ &(ql, G, !);
answer ql, otherwise.
• leave all the queries in the waiting pool, if∑)&(qi, G, !)* < !;
remove them, if there exists qi(T ) not satisfying !-uncertainty property;
answer them, otherwise.
With a similar reason as in the proof of Lemma 8, we have the following result.
Lemma 9 The !-uncertainty joint strategy satisfies !-uncertainty property, and it has no
worse data utility than the !-uncertainty strategy
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In this thesis, we addressed the micro-data auditing issue in revealing useful information
about a secret table while preserving private information of individual records. We have
proposed a novel !-uncertainty strategy for micro-data auditing under the !-uncertainty pri-
vacy property. We have shown how to make decisions for preventing data privacy breaches
resulted from answering or denying a query. We have shown that our strategy can pre-
vent not only real answers but also denials from breaching the data privacy. In extended
work, we also studied the case of concurrent queries where no inherent order exists among
the queries. We have shown that checking concurrent queries in different orders does not
breach the data privacy. An optimal order can thus be chosen to improve data utility. Based
on this result, we extend the basic strategy to !-uncertainty delay and !-uncertainty joint
strategies both of which aim to reduce unnecessary impact on data utility. The first strategy
waits for queries to render a denied query safe, and the second strategy combines the an-
swers to multiple denied queries such that all of them may get a chance to be answered. As
a first step towards the study of auditing microdata disclosure, we have not considered the
computational complexity of our proposed strategies. This will be one of the main focuses
of our future work. We also plan to further study the data utility issue in such a context.
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